Abstract. Suppose that n individuals assign values to a sequence of m numerical decision variables subject to the constraints that the m values assigned by each individual must be nonnegative and sum to some fixed positive or. Suppose that we wish to aggregate their individual assignments to produce consensual values of these variables satisfying the aforementioned constraints. Acz61 and Wagner have shown that if m -> 3, then a method of aggregation is based on weighted arithmetic averaging ilI (a) the consensual value assigned to each variable depends only on the values assigned by individuals to that variable and (b) the consensual value is zero if all individuals assign that variable the value zero. In the present paper we extend this result in various ways, dropping the unanimity condition (b) [2]). So we may wish also to drop the condition z >0 (or/z >_-0) and let I be any (finite) real interval. In addition, conditions like (b) are only plausible if aggregation is carried out "internally" among the n individuals. If these individuals functioned as advisors to some external decisionmaker and he was responsible for aggregation, he might very well decide to ignore their unanimity. We are thus motivated in the present *
1. Suppose that a group of n individuals wish to assign values to a sequence of m numerical decision variables. We call such a problem an allocation problem if the values assigned must be nonnegative and sum to some fixed positive number Examples of allocation problems abound, including, for example, the assignment of probabilities to a sequence of pairwise disjoint, exhaustive events, and the distribution of a fixed sum of money or other resource r among m projects.
In general we may expect that individuals will differ in the values that they assign to the variables, and hence be faced with the problem of [2] , [3] , [4], [9] We suppose that there exist bounded functions (2) i'I" -R (j 1, 2,..., m) (in fact, it will suffice to assume merely that at least one (I)io is bounded below on some proper rectangle [ 
To motivate the compatibility conditions in (1) for the study of (3), we observe that, in general the set S ={Zl I"lz2, z,. I such that .=1 z (r} is a subinterval (n-dimensional) of I and (3) provides information about (I)i only on S. Thus it is natural to assume that the domain I" of (I)j is equal to S, which is equivalent to (1). The following theorem characterizes the aggregation methods which satisfy (2) and (3) when there are at least three decision variables (m => 3): THEOREM 1. For fixed rn >= 3, an aggregation method satisfies (2) and (3) 
EBi 1-to tr, i=1 such that, for all z ('1, ", 'n) In,
(/" 1,...,m).
The tot (i 1, 2, , n) will be called weights. 
satisfy (10) fef and E z'.=0 ::
We In view of (12), we get from (11), with =x, 2=y, 3=-x-y, 4 =0, the Cauchy equation (13) O(x)+(y)=(x+y),
x,y,x+y [-e,e] .
This ff can be extended uniquely to a function " " satisfying (14) (x)+q(y)=(x +y) allx, y
This extension theorem is due to Dar6czy and Losonczi [5] . (For completeness we include in the appendix a shorter proof, cf. [3] , [6] , [8] (9) , (7), and (14) give i(z)-,(0)= i(z-ml-----tr)-'(-1--tr) =m (z-ml---tr) (-m l ----t r )
that is, (6) holds with/3j (0). The functions i given by (6) Thus/31 =/31 /3,. 0, so that (6) goes over into (21). We consider next the effect of specifying, in place of (2), the stronger (and more natural) condition (22) do]" I" --> L l <-j <-m (in fact, it suffices to posit this range restriction for ] e J, where J is some nonempty subset of {1,..., m}). 
tz -/zE**-vY_,* <13] "(2 V b"-'**--/A''-' where X* *00 denotes the sum of the negative weights and ** **0 denotes the sum of the positive weights, and the two inequality symbols < and "<2 are either < or (iv) <x is < and <2 is </]" E*= 0 and X**= 0.
Proof. The specification (22) implies (2) as J # and so, by Theorem 1, (22) and (3) imply (23) 
